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Abstract
We investigate a free-entry market in which incumbents engage in lobbying for
changing regulations, which aect the cost of all rms equally. We nd that incum-
bents have incentive to weaken or strengthen regulations, depending on the demand
condition.
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1 Introduction
Regulations aect the costs of industry, and incumbent rms often try to inuence the
behavior of the policymakers (Lowry, 1992; Engel, 1997). Electric power companies, steel
manufacturers, and automobile manufacturers often face stricter emissions and/or fuel ef-
ciency regulations that raise costs. However, it is not always true that incumbent rms
require weaker regulations. ARCO, the largest retailer of gasoline in California, proposed
a stricter (greener) gasoline regulation in the 1990s and DuPont, the largest chlorouo-
rocarbons (CFCs) producer, played a substantial role in strengthening the international
regulation on alternative CFCs in the 1980s (Cai and Li, 2016). In 2016, the Japan Vaca-
tion Rental Association proposed a stricter regulation as a countermeasure to neighborhood
noise, which might increase the future costs of incumbents as well as new entrants at several
regulatory reform councils.1
A natural interpretation of such cost-increasing lobbying is that a stricter regulation
raises rivals' costs more signicantly, and strengthens the competitive advantage of the
incumbent dominant rms. Based on discussions of \raising rivals' costs" developed by
Salop and Scheman (1983), Cai and Li (2016) formulated a model in which a stricter
regulation aects costs non-uniformly among rms. The authors showed that rms whose
competitive advantages are improved by a stricter regulation might engage in cost-raising
lobbying.
In this study, we show that even when a stricter regulation uniformly raises the cost of all
rms, including both incumbents and new entrants, incumbents might engage in lobbying
for a stricter regulation. We show that in free-entry markets, incumbents attempt to raise
(reduce) common costs when the demand function is strictly convex (concave).2
1http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/001127433.pdf (in Japanese).
2Free entry is crucial for this result. The result|that an increase in the common regulation cost increases
the industry prots|does not appear without new entries. In many contexts, free-entry markets yield
contrasting implications. See Cato and Matsumura (2013), Etro (2007), Hattori and Yoshikawa (2016),
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2 Model
There are m( 1) incumbent rms and innitely many potential new entrants. Each poten-
tial new entrant (a follower) has a cost function Cf (x) + F + rx, where Cf (x) : R+ 7! R+
is the production cost, F 2 R++ is the xed-entry cost, and r is a regulation cost that
is determined by the lobbing by the incumbent rms. Each incumbent rm (a leader)
has a cost function Cl(x) + F + rx, and the entry cost F has already been sunk. We as-
sume that, for k = f; l, Ck is twice dierentiable, C
0
k > 0, C
00
k > 0, lim
x!0
C 0k(x) ! 0, and
lim
x!1
C 0k(x)!1. r is a regulation cost per unit that is determined by the lobbying by the
incumbent rms. Let X be the total output in the market. The (inverse) demand function
is given by P (X) : R+ 7! R++, where P (X) is twice dierentiable and P 0(X) < 0 for all X
as long as P > 0.
Each incumbent engages in cost-raising or cost-reducing lobbying activities. Each in-
cumbent rm i (i = 1; :::;m) chooses the level of lobbying activities yi 2 [y; y] with
 1 < y < 0 < y < 1. A positive (negative) yi implies that the incumbent i attempts
to increase (decrease) the common regulation cost. Both cost-raising and cost-reducing
lobbying activities require cost and are given by g(y) : [y; y] 7! [0;1], which is nite and
dierentiable on (y; y). We assume g0 > 0 8y 2 (0; y), g0(0) = 0, g0 < 0 8y 2 (y; 0),
g00 > 0, lim
y!y
g0(y)!1, and lim
y!y
g0(y)!1. We further assume that g00 is suciently large
so that all relevant second-order conditions are satised. The regulation cost r is given by
r = h(y1; y2; :::; yn) with 8i; @h=@yi > 0 and h(0; :::; 0) = r.3
The game proceeds as follows. In the rst stage, each incumbent rm i (i = 1; :::;m)
chooses yi 2 [y; y]. In the second stage, after observing r, each incumbent rm i indepen-
dently chooses xi. In the third stage, after observing r and the total output by the incum-
bents, potential new entrants choose whether they enter the market. In the fourth stage,
Lahiri and Ono (1995, 2007), Lee (1999), and Matsumura and Kanda (2005).
3We assume that P (0) > r because otherwise no rm might engage in production in equilibrium.
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after observing the number of new entrants n, each new entrant j (j = m + 1; :::;m + n)
independently chooses xj. We assume that the demand is suciently large and/or F is
suciently small so that n > 0 holds in all relevant subgames.
3 Equilibrium
We solve the game by backward induction. In the fourth stage, follower i (i = m+1; :::;m+n)
simultaneously chooses xi to maximize its prot, given r and Xl 
Pm
i=1 xi. The rst-order
condition is given by
P 0xi + P   C 0f   r = 0: (1)
We assume the second-order condition is satised (i.e., 2P 0 + xiP 00   C 00f < 0). A sucient
condition for this is P 0 + xiP 00 < 0 (i.e., strategies are strategic substitutes). Another
sucient condition is that C 00f is suciently large. We assume symmetric equilibrium in this
stage. Let xf be the equilibrium output of each follower at this stage.
In the third stage, innitely many potential new entrants decide whether to enter the
market. The number of entrants n is given by the zero prot condition:
Pxf   Cf   rxf   F = 0: (2)
Equations (1) and (2) determine n and xf given Xl and r.
We now present how the total output of incumbents Xl aects the equilibrium price
of the subgame starting from the third stage. This property is known in the literature on
free-entry markets (see Etro, 2007; Ino and Matsumura, 2012).
Lemma 1: The output of incumbents Xl does not aect the equilibrium price P .
Proof: See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 states that the output of the incumbents does not aect the equilibrium price.
A larger Xl reduces the residual demand for new entrants, and thus, reduces the number
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of entering rms. However, it does not aect xf . Because the equilibrium price is equal to
the average cost of each new entrant (i.e., P = r+(Cf (x

f )+F )=x

f ), Xl does not aect the
equilibrium price as long as n > 0.
We now discuss the second stage. Each incumbent i (i = 1; :::;m) chooses xi to maximize
Pxi Cl  rxi  g(yi) given r. From Lemma 1, all incumbents take price P as given in this
stage. The rst-order condition is
P = C 0l + r: (3)
We denote each incumbent i's output by xi = x

l .
In the rst stage, each incumbent i (i = 1; :::;m) chooses yi to maximize i = Px

l  
Cl   rxl   g(yi). The rst-order condition is
@i=@yi = x

l (@P=@r   1)@r=@yi + @xl =@yi(P   C 0l   r)  g0 = 0: (4)
The second term in (4) is zero from (3). Because xl and @r=@yi in the rst term in (1) are
positive, each incumbent chooses positive yi (i.e., engages in cost-raising lobbying) if and
only if @P=@r > 1:
We now present our main result.
Proposition 1: For all i(= 1; :::;m), yi > (<;=) 0 if P
00 > (<;=) 0: That is, incumbent
i(= 1; :::;m) attempts to increase (attempts to decrease/does not attempt to aect) the
common cost r if the demand function is strictly convex (strictly concave/linear).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Thus, in free-entry markets, incumbents might attempt to increase the common cost,
depending on the demand conditions. In addition, our result suggests potential danger of
using linear demand in the analysis of free-entry markets. In our model, the common cost
does not aect the prot of the incumbents (and thus, y = 0) under linear demand. This
result, however, never holds under any type of non-linear demand.
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Finally, we briey discuss the welfare implications. Ino and Matsumura (2012) showed
that the existence of leaders always improves welfare in free-entry markets. However, in our
model, an increase in r reduces total social surplus unless it reduces social costs, which are
not discussed in this note. Thus, if the demand is strictly convex, this welfare loss might
dominate the welfare gain pointed out by Ino and Matsumura (2012) and the existence of
leaders could be harmful for social welfare.
4 Concluding remarks
In this study, we demonstrate that the incumbents might engage in cost-raising lobbying
even when it uniformly raises the cost of both incumbents and new entrants. Incumbents
engage in such lobbying if the demand function is strictly convex. A stricter regulation,
however, might increase the cost of new entrants more signicantly. In this case, cost-
raising lobbying might appear even when the demand function is strictly concave.
In our setting, cost-raising lobbying is harmful for welfare. It increases the cost of
production (regulation cost) directly, and the lobbying activity itself is wasteful from the
welfare viewpoint. The former eect is also harmful from the viewpoint of consumer welfare.
However, this result may not hold in the presence of negative externality of production. An
increase in the price reduces the social loss of the negative externality and it may improve
welfare. Incorporating the negative externality into our analysis and investigating welfare
and policy implications remains for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We show that dxf=dXl = 0. Then, from (2), we obtain that P is independent of Xl.
Dierentiating (1) and (2), we obtain
xfP
0 + xf
2P 00 (n+ 1)P 0 + nxfP
00   C 00f
xf
2P 0 nxfP
0 + P   C 0f   r

dn
dxf

=
 P 0   xfP 00
 xfP 0

dXl: (5)
Using (1), nxfP
0 + P   C 0f   r = (n  1)xfP 0. It follows that
det

xfP
0 + xf
2P 00 (n+ 1)P 0 + nxfP
00   C 00f
xf
2P 0 nxfP
0 + P   C 0f   r

=  xf 2P 0(P 0 + xfP 00)  xf 2(P 0)2 + xf 2P 0C 00f < 0
(6)
because the second-order condition of the fourth stage ensures P 0 + xfP
00 < C 00f   P 0.
Applying Cramer's rule to (5), we obtain dxf=dXl = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
We show that yi > (<;=) 0 if dP=dr > (<;=) 1: Thus, all we have to show is that
dP=dr > (<;=) 1 if P 00 > (<;=) 0:
Because P depends on X  nxf +Xl, we obtain
dP
dr
= (xf
dn
dr
+ n
dxf
dr
+
dXl
dr
)P 0: (7)
Dierentiating (1){(3) yields0@xfP 0 + xf 2P 00 (n+ 1)P 0 + nxfP 00   C 00f P 0 + xfP 00xf 2P 0 (n  1)xfP 0 xfP 0
xfP
0 nP 0 P 0   C00l
m
1A0@ dndxf
dXl
1A =
0@ 1xf
1
1A dr: (8)
Dividing the second row of (8) by xfP
0dr, we obtain
xf
dn
dr
+ n
dxf
dr
+
dXl
dr
=
dxf
dr
+
1
P 0
: (9)
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Substituting (9) into (7), we obtain
dP
dr
= 1 + P 0
dxf
dr
: (10)
Thus, dP=dr > (<;=) 1 if dxf=dr < (>;=) 0.
Applying Cramer's rule to (8), it follows that
dxf
dr
=
xfP
00
 P 0(P 0 + xfP 00)  (P 0)2 + P 0C 00f
; (11)
where the denominator is negative from (6). Because xf > 0, the sign of dx

f=dr is the
opposite to that of P 00. Q.E.D.
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